

The European Security System: Prospects and Hopes

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Introduction

At the end of World War II, the USA became a long-term actor in European security. During the Cold War a complex security system was developed in Europe, and it continued to function even after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s as the USA, seeking to maintain its once-again-acquired status of the only superpower, preserved its special role in the system. The system formed after the end of Cold War was not, in fact, created on the basis of a new world order, as it was publicly declared. The policy of the USA was not aiming to create a wholly new European security system as it missed on clearly defining the place of Russia in Europe and was efficient at blocking alternative visions of the future of European security.

The situation began to change at the beginning of the 21st century when EU member states found it necessary to develop a new strategic vision of European security, and in 2003 the *European Security Strategy* was developed. The document noted that the collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp considerably changed the European security environment. Broad cooperation of EU member states allowed to remove the problem of military threats inside the alliance. Within the ideology of globalism, it was proclaimed that interdependence of states and regions is becoming not only an economic, but also a political and cultural factor, thus promoting the formation of a more secure world.

However, by 2008 the credibility of these assessments was called into question, first of all, by Russia dissatisfied with the post-Cold war agenda and the European security system. In 2016, the *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* was accepted as it focused on achieving pragmatic purposes. Nonetheless, the West's hope that Russia would reconcile with the status ascribed to it is to be evaluated as groundless and as one falling short of taking the political history of Europe into account. Based upon the dominating role of the EU and the NATO, the European

security system was unstable, and the optimism about the strategy proved unjustified. In the intense relations between the West and Russia, there is a strong pattern of *déjà vu* when familiar threats lead to well-familiar strategic recommendations, forming a framework for a second Cold War.

In the 21st century, what kind of global order could be in place and have the new European security system as its element? It is possible to allocate several images of the future developed in the West. The process of developing the new security system demands re-structuring the European space and build on the basis of three poles (the EU, Russia and the USA), institutions of various nature and *Intermarium* (or between-in lands). Its actors have different sensitivity to security problems, needs and priorities and, as a result, pursue different agendas.

The multi-polar nature of the European security system makes intense relations between its actors inevitable. Moreover, it contains gaps which are most apparent in such regions as the Balkans, in *Intermarium* and Crimea where historical tensions and centuries-old conflicts are still present. And the ways to decrease the risk of destabilization in the system turn out to be tied not to a reduction of the quantity of its poles, but to strengthening the interaction between them, thus creating necessary conditions for restraining the congenital instability of the system. In the medium run, an evolution of the European security system towards creating a uniform security space would allow to create necessary conditions for controlling the tension between the system's poles and reducing the gaps in *Intermarium* and the wide European neighbourhood.

The multi-polar nature of the European security system creates conditions both for achieving stability and causing destabilization at the same time, which can trigger crises and conflicts in *Intermarium*. And it is necessary to understand that in the medium run, considering the growing rivalry between the poles and the aspiration of regional elites to exploit this rivalry for advantages, there is no hope for a full settlement of the conflicts and the creation of a stable uniform European security space. Efforts to strengthen European security have to be based on clear long-term strategic objectives. Reactive and short-term efforts can only provide limited results, without touching upon the prime causes of crises and conflicts. For this

purpose, a general political will and awareness of shared European responsibility and destiny is required.

1. History of the Formation of the European Security System After the End of the Cold War

At the end of World War II the USA realized that in order to prevent a major war in Europe they have to become a long-term actor of the European security system. During the Cold War the complex European security system has evolved in Europe through NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the evolving EU and OSCE multilateral frameworks.

The system continued to function after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, as well, when the USA, seeking to keep its newly acquired status of the only superpower, conserved its special status in the European security system. The situation began to change at the beginning of the 21st century when the USA initiated a process of adapting the American security system to the changes in the international security environment where irregular threats and actors began to prevail. As a result, the USA was forced to pay less attention to the European security system. The expansion of the EU and NATO, it seemed, had finished the process of stabilizing Europe as its status was reduced to a “success story” or a point in the list of “the works done.”¹

In these evolving conditions, EU member states saw it fit to develop a new strategic vision of European security, and in 2003 the European Security Strategy was issued.² The document stated that the collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp followed by the formation of a multi-polar world considerably changed the European security environment. Cooperation of the EU member states transferred some functions of sovereignty to Brus-

¹ Alcaro, Riccardo. (2011). “Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe.” in Alcaro, Riccardo and Erik Jones *European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations*. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)-SAIS Bologna Centre: Edizioni Nuova Cultura, p.17. Access 09 April 2018 <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_01.pdf>.

² European Security Strategy. (2003). *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. European Council, 12-13 December 2003. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world>>.

sels qualitatively simplifying interaction and removing the problem of military threats in the system. On a substantial part of the European continent a system of comprehensive mutual openness was developed which in theory was to replace the traditional balance of power. Following the ideology of globalism, it was proclaimed that this interdependence of states and regions is becoming not only an economic, but also a political and cultural factor, promoting the formation of a more secure world.³

However, by 2008 the validity of such an assessment was called into question, first of all, by Russia dissatisfied with the post-Cold War political agenda and European security system. Based upon a dominate role of the EU and NATO, the system proved unstable, and the optimism about the European security strategy of 2003 proved unreasonable.⁴ For example, the strategy stated that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.”⁵ But the spread of democracy and deployment of good governance were difficult and, sometimes, unrealizable in some countries owing to the lack of the required cultural, social and economic contexts.⁶

On June 28, 2016 at the NATO summit in Warsaw, the Chief of EU foreign policy and the vice-president of the European Commission Federica Mogherini presented *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and*

³ Egmont Papers 1. (2004). *A European Security Concept for the 21st Century*. Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), Brussels, Belgium, p. 5. Access 09 April 2018 <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rik_Coolsaet/publication/29998581_A-European_Security_Concept_for_the_21st_Century_Egmont_Paper_No_1_April_2004/links/5510380c0cf2ba84483d2a27/A-European-Security-Concept-for-the-21st-Century-Egmont-Paper-No-1-April-2004.pdf>.

⁴ Alcaro, *Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe*, p. 17.

⁵ European Security Strategy. *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, p. 10.

⁶ Biscop, Sven. (2017). “The EU Global Strategy and the Great Powers or Realpolitik Revisited.” In: *The EU Global Strategy: Implications for Russia*, Institute of Europe. Moscow and Egmont: Russian Academy of Sciences and the Royal Institute for International Relations, pp. 7-15. Access 09 April 2018 <<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2017/11/EU-Global-Strategy-IE-RAS-Egmont.pdf? type=pdf>>.

*Security Policy*⁷ which was an improved version of 2003's European Security Strategy. The choice of time of the document's publication was not propitious since after the British referendum-initiated Brexit on June 23, 2016 no one could pay proper attention to the document. The Global Strategy (2016) appeared at a moment of high uncertainty and radical changes in the international security environment when traditional military-political alliances were called into question, and national and regional political and economic interests were formed along old and new fault lines.⁸

The new strategy was born not from ambitions and an abstract belief in the idea of integration, but from an understanding of the gravity of the geopolitical situation in Europe.⁹ The advantage of the document is its aspiration to establish a balance between isolationism and interventionism, "dreamy idealism and unprincipled pragmatism"¹⁰ which the strategy calls is derived from realism's "principled pragmatism."¹¹

Thus, the Global Strategy of 2016 focused on achieving pragmatic purposes through actions, not intentions. It is the first document of the EU which defines the following vital interests which are important for member states:

- security of EU citizens and territory;
- prosperity;
- democracy; and

⁷ A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, Brussels: EEAS, June 2016. <https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf>.

⁸ Giannessi, Alessandra. (2017). *Europe in a Changing Global Order: Militarization and the New EU Global Strategy for Security and Defence*. Transform! European Network for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue Epaper, Brussels, Belgium, November 2017, p. 3. Access 09 April 2018 <https://www.transform-network.net/fileadmin/user_upload/epaper_gianessi_global_strategy4_final.pdf>.

⁹ Techau, Jan. "The EU's New Global Strategy: Useful or Pointless?" *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Europe*. Brussels, July 01, 2016. Access 09 April 2018<<http://carnegieEAEurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=63994>>.

¹⁰ Biscop, Sven. "EU Foreign Policy Between the Revolution and the Status Quo." *Policy Brief*, No. 9. Brussels:Institute for European Studies, November 2014. <http://www.ies.be/files/2014_9_PB.pdf>.

¹¹ A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, *Shared Vision, Common Action*, p. 16.

- promotion of a rules-based world order for adopting policy from the position of power.

This allocation of vital interests allowed defining five priorities:

- EU security;
- resilience of the neighbourhood;
- behaviour in war and crisis;
- worldwide stable regional orders; and
- effective global governance.¹²

The Global Strategy of 2016 soberly estimated the ability of the EU to transform its security environment and recognized that the alliance practically had likely no influence processes in the wide neighbourhood. As Sven Biscop notes, the rhetoric on an advance of democracy was absent in this renewed document. This somewhat overdue step is not about underestimating democratic values. What it does is emphasize the need of a calm advance of democracy rather than a missionary zeal which often brings about the reversed results.¹³

Mogherini's Global Strategy intends to build a strong and independent EU which would be able to perform functions of a global security provider. As she said "...our partners all over the world view Europe as a global security provider, an indispensable power for peace and human development."¹⁴ And at the same time

"European security does not depend solely on our military might. This is one of the central ideas underpinning the Global Strategy; multilateralism, sustainable development, human rights and resilience are just as important as defence, if we want to make Europe more secure."¹⁵

¹² Biscop, *The EU Global Strategy and the Great Powers or Realpolitik Revisited*.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Mogherini, Federica. (2017). "Preface." In EUISS Yearbook of European Security (YES) 2017, *European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, France, 2017*, p. 5. Access 09 April 2018 <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/YES_Book_2017.pdf>.

¹⁵ Mogherini, *Preface*, p. 6.

The document also has shortcomings. One can note its indecisive approach to what Mogherini calls “strategic autonomy” for the EU. Understanding the desire of the EU to develop a foreign policy and defence institutions capable of ensuring Europe’s own security without relying on the USA, the document could have been more realistic about the feasibility of this option.¹⁶ In the short and medium run any EU security policy will still have to depend on Washington, and the USA will remain the key actor of the European security system.

2. The Revival of the Russian Challenge and the Problems of the European Security System

The Strategic Context of the European Security System

The European security system includes a set of power centres and institutions of various nature. One important element of the system is the EU itself; the most integrated organization in the world covering intergovernmental and supranational governance elements, but not, yet, in the sphere of defence. Nonetheless, even by seeking to develop autonomous military opportunities, the EU would still solve the problem of providing for European security mainly by non-military means. The EU is a unique example of the ability of states divided through many centuries by competition and conflict to create space for peace and stability through economic and political integration relying on shared values and norms.¹⁷

NATO remains the most important element of European security as the majority of the continent’s states – including the most economically and technologically developed ones – are EU members. The peculiarity of NATO is the USA being its most influential member. And for the European NATO member states it is this role that makes the Alliance so valuable. It is due to the USA that, in many respects, NATO in the 21st century has not only a regional, but also a global role and is involved in military missions outside Europe, solving problems which are not connected directly with territorial protection of its member states.

¹⁶ Techau, *The EU’s New Global Strategy*.

¹⁷ Alcaro, *Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe*, p. 22.

Another important influencing factor for the European security system is Russia and its view on the problems of European security which differs starkly from that of the West. This concerns, first of all, the role of NATO. Moscow understands that distinctions are acceptable if Russia's security interests are considered properly. But after the end of the Cold War, the declared process of transforming such elements as NATO or the OSCE was not deep enough to convince Russia of an absence of threats. The creation of the CSTO by Russia became a response to this and providing Russian influence upon the most part of the former Soviet Union than any other function. Russia has a clear understanding that the CSTO cannot replace the Warsaw Pact and is rather Eurasian, than European by nature.¹⁸

Acknowledging the “strategic solitude”¹⁹ of Russia allows to comprehend its fluctuating approach to the West. On the one hand, NATO movement to the Russian borders is perceived as open threat, with another, cooperation, even with opponents, on global and European security problems promotes saving of the status of the great power by Russia.²⁰

Thus, the actors of the European security system have different sensitivity, needs and priorities when it comes to security problems and, as a result, they often pursue different agendas. Besides, the existing European security landscape has gaps when uniting into a joint system has a compelled character. Gaps and inconsistencies are most notable in such regions as the Balkans, Moldova, the Caucasus and Crimea where historical tensions and centuries-old conflicts exist. The events of recent times in the relations between the West and Russia led to a revival of military security threats in Europe that are, as appears, already being conceived as historical ones. The management of such threats will become one of the most complex challenges of the new European security system.

¹⁸ Alcaro, *Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe*, p. 30.

¹⁹ Gomart, Thomas. “Russia Alone Forever? The Kremlin’s Strategic Solitude “, *Politique étrangère special issue*, World Policy Conference, 2008, p. 23-33. Access 09 April 2018 <https://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=PE_HS02_0023>.

²⁰ Alcaro, *Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe*, p. 28.

Ordering Moment

In order to understand the dynamics of the transition to a post-Cold War era, the concept of the “ordering moment” that appears in the works of the political scientist John Ikenberry is useful.²¹ An ordering moment can be defined as a period that is decisive, but limited in time, when the power, identity, norms and structures of the previous eras lose their dominating influence and many scenarios of the future become possible. Though Ikenberry uses this concept in relation to the period following major wars, it can be applied to understanding the types of transitions which the political theorist William Sewell defined as “moments of accelerated change” even if they are not followed by bloodshed.²² Processes taking place during “ordering moments” are studied by complexity science and the complex adaptive systems theory.²³ For example, one can mention the state of “punctuated equilibrium”²⁴ initiated by self-organizing criticality.²⁵

It is possible to claim that many problems in West-Russia relations are a result of decisions that took place during the ordering moment after the end of Cold War. The grand strategy of the USA and the West in general was eventually reduced to merely spreading the Cold War institutions – first of all, the NATO and the EU – further to the East and into the future and not creating a truly new global order and the new European security system, as it was publicly declared. The use of such concepts as post-Cold

²¹ John Ikenberry defined such moments as times when “the rules and institutions of the international order are on the table for negotiation and change” See: Ikenberry, John G. (2011). *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 12.

²² Sewell, W. H. Jr. (1996). “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 25, Issue 6, pp. 841-881.

²³ Арзуманян Р.В. (2012). *Кромка хаоса. Парадигма нелинейности и среда безопасности 21 века*. Издательский дом “Регнум”, Серия SelectaXIX, Москва.

²⁴ The evolutionary concept which cornerstone is postulate of alternation of stages of rapid development of forms and almost full conservatism (in the absence of smooth transitions between stages), offered by Gould Stephen and Niles Eldredge in 1972. See Gould, Stephen Jay and Niles Eldredge. (1977). “Punctuated equilibria: tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered.” *Paleobiology 1977, Vol. III, No. 2*, pp. 115-151.

²⁵ Prigogine, Пиа and Isabelle Stengers. (1984). *Order out of Chaos*. New York: Bantam Books, 1984; Bak, Per. *How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality*.

War, post-Soviet space and states, etc. emphasized the new era's dependence on the previous one. The post-Cold War framework kept the security institutions of Cold War almost unchanged, thereby transferring its problem and conflicts into the new era. The chronic and smoldering conflicts throughout the post-soviet space, including the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) problem, are in many respects a consequence of this decision.

As Mary Sarotte puts it, the American "prefabrication policy" allowed to achieve rapid success and block alternative visions of the future of European security.²⁶ The forming European security system was not created on the basis of a new world order, and it was not trying to create a truly new European security system.²⁷ Moreover, the system did not even define clearly the place and role of Russia in Europe; "the entire post-Cold War European political and security architecture was built on the foundation of two institutions – the EU and NATO – which did not include Russia."²⁸ The West judged from that "Russia would eventually accept these institutions; that was clearly a bad wager."²⁹ The year 2004 in this sense was decisive when major expansion of the EU and NATO took place and now included the Baltic States formerly part of the USSR. By then, "the best opportunity to forge a new, inclusive order for Europe and Eurasia had passed."³⁰ What caused such a decision and why the American and Western establishment came to the conclusion that Russia would not be revived are interesting subjects for political history researchers to study.

²⁶ Sarotte, Mary Elise. (2017). "The Renewal of the Russian Challenge in European Security: History as a Guide to Policy," *Transatlantic Academy Paper Series*, No 9, Transatlantic Academy, p. 2. Access 09 April 2018 <<http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Sarottepercent20percent20RenewalRussianpercent20final.pdf>>.

²⁷ Sarotte, M. E. (2014). *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²⁸ Menon, R. and E. Rumer. (2015). *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order*. Boston: MIT Press, p. 162.

²⁹ Charap, S. and T. J. Colton. "Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia." *Adelphi*, London: IISS, 12 January, 2017, p. 26. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/bypercent20year/2017-cd3c/everyone-loses-21b7>>.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

Taking a look into political history of the Cold War allows to offer some recommendations on how to react to the evolving situation. First of all, an active dialogue with Russia – instead of attempts to isolate it – is necessary.³¹ The realization of this necessity is extremely important as risks are huge, especially for the young post-Soviet states. Moreover, unlike the first Cold War, the second one is happening in a global multi-polar world. To develop is important to both Europe and the world. And the challenges in this are tied not to individuals or policies of certain countries, but the existent changes in world order when the modern version of Palmerston’s and Bismarck’s balance-of-forces policy comes back to the international arena and renders volatile the balance of friendship and hostility.³²

From this point of view, Russia’s strategy in the post-Soviet space, including violent changes of state borders which break one of the norms of the post-Cold War framework, can be considered not only an element of war, but also an offer to begin a political dialogue and form and a new ordering moment. This message can be read practically in an open form in the latest interviews of the Russian president.³³

The West’s hope that Russia will reconcile with the status ascribed to it is to be evaluated as groundless and as one falling short of taking the political history of Europe into account.³⁴ The possibility of a major war between nuclear rivals in Europe turns out to be a consequence of incorrect assessments of the strategic context of their relations.

3. Projects of Global Order and the Civilizational Context of the Formation of the New European Security System

In the 21st century, what kind of global order could be in place and have the new European security system as its element? It is possible to allocate some visions of the future developed in the West.

³¹ Sarotte, *The Renewal of the Russian Challenge in European Security*, p. 9.

³² Biscop, *The EU Global Strategy and the Great Powers or Realpolitik Revisited*, p. 9.

³³ See, for example, movie Putin V. V. and V. Solovyov. “*World order2018*”, March, 2018. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://youtu.be/MHvRsrxFhAY>>.

³⁴ Sarotte, *The Renewal of the Russian Challenge in European Security*, p. 8.

Kissinger's Vision

One of the best-known projects of global order is the Kissingerian one³⁵, where the author claims that the world's political system is facing a historic turning point. First, the very nature of states, as the basic constructing elements of the global political system, is in many aspects being pressured. Secondly, the collision between the global economy and the still-necessary traditional political institutions founded on the basis of nation states is another serious problem. The third problem is the lack of effective mechanism for great-power-interaction on a wide range of problems. According to Kissinger, the only way to avoid repeating negative scenarios is to establish a new type of relations between great powers based on the Westphalian system and balance of power applied globally and not only regionally. The world needs a governing committee of the leading world powers, one similar to the concert of great powers in the 19th century's Europe. This approach to establishing regional and international order on the basis of the differing civilizational values will demand serious re-organization of the global political system.

However, a Westphalia-based world order is doubtful for the 21st century. Kissinger's ideas are viewed as unrealizable in a world of non-state actors, irregular threats, global terrorism and connectivity. The global order of Kissinger's model suggests the existence of great powers operating in vast time-periods. The latter is impossible in the turbulence era when states and international organizations have extremely low horizons of strategic forecasting.³⁶ Time-proven tools of geopolitics and diplomacy based on the deterrence strategy, balance of power, the art of concluding alliances, etc. seem to be inadequate in the context of rapid qualitative changes in the global political system.³⁷

³⁵ Kissinger, Henry. (2014). *World Order*. New York: Penguin.

³⁶ Арзуманян, *Кромка хаоса*.

³⁷ Leonard, Mark. (2017). "The era of Mutually Assured Disruption," in Ulrike Esther Franke, Manuel Lafont Rapnouil & Susi Dennison (Eds.). *The New European Security Initiative*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), p. 7. Access 09 April 2018 <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR222_-_THE_NEW_EUROPEAN_SECURITY_INITIATIVE.pdf>.

Bauman's Vision

The world order vision built on a metaphor “liquid modernity” put forward by a Polish-British sociologist Zygmunt Bauman is noteworthy, as well. In Bauman’s “liquid world”, many previously “solid” actors and objects have become liquid, and society no longer unites around collective projects offering the individual ideas, a sense of community and direction for development.³⁸ The metaphor of “the liquid modernity” well correlates with the vision of global political order and security environment in complexity science and in the complex adaptive systems theory.³⁹ Bauman mainly inquired into the “liquid” modern individual and their role in society. This individual gives form to a type of modernity in which security is defined by fluidity and not by order. Bauman notes five factors that result in “liquid security.”⁴⁰

1. Threats such as terrorism, cyber wars, migration flows, etc. erase the borders between foreign and domestic policy. As a result, the notion of law and order is changed as foreign policy is no longer a prerogative of the state only, and the central spheres of domestic policy – i.e. preservation of law and order – have to be ready to operate through external forces as well.
2. Borders between war and peace are being erased, and the number of domains of war is increasing.
3. The connectivity and globalization processes which united the world begin to break off when Internet and the cyberspace begin to be used for conducting military operations. The key idea of the liberal world order that partners connected by commercial and other ties are not inclined to war with each other proved incorrect.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

³⁹ Арзуманян, *Кромка хаоса*.

⁴⁰ Leonard, *The era of Mutually Assured Disruption*, pp. 7-9.

4. The era of stable alliances has ended. In the modern security environment, alliances are based not on values, long-term agreements and institutions, but on short-term interests and *ad-hoc* strategy.
5. The world is no longer defined by a balance of great powers only, as the activity of non-state actors of various nature play a major role as well.

The Club of Rome Vision

According to the Club of Rome, the world is facing a deep crisis which is not cyclic but rising by nature as it covers both the environment, and the social, political, cultural and all other domains of public life while billions of people no longer trust their governments, democracy, political ideologies and global capitalism.⁴¹ Global capitalism has led to movements of capital from the sectors of production and trade into the financial one.⁴² Bruce Bartlett – a senior policy advisor to both the Reagan and Bush administrations – claims that the “financialization” of the economy is taking place and it is the reason of the increased inequality of income, drops of salaries and unsatisfactory labour productivity. David Stockman – Reagan’s director of the Office of Management and Budget – agrees on this, describing the current situation as “corrosive financialization that has turned the economy into a giant casino since the 1970s.”⁴³

How could the global community cope with the approaching crisis? The Club of Rome brings attention to Kenneth Boulding’s *The Meaning of the*

⁴¹ Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich von and Anders Wijkman (2018). *Come On! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet*. A Report to the Club of Rome, New York, NY: Springer, p. 2.

⁴² Greenwood, R. and Scharfstein D. “The growth of finance,” in *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No 3, Spring 2013, pp. 3-28. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.27.2.3>>.

⁴³ Bartlett, Bruce. “Financialization as a source of economic malaise,” in NY Times, 11 June 2013. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/financialization-as-a-cause-of-economic-malaise/>>; Stockman, David. “We’re blind to the debt bubble,” interview with Paul Solman. PBS Newshour, 30 May 2013. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/david-stockman-were-blind-to-t>>.

*Twentieth Century*⁴⁴ where the author gives a metaphor of *Spaceship Earth* where mankind is the steward of this new Earth.⁴⁵ However people cannot be successful stewards with ideals and models of development which were created during the era of the “*empty world*” when the population of Earth was small, and natural resources seemed inexhaustible. Since the second half of the 20th century, many thinkers have realized that the situation has changed qualitatively, and mankind now needs to get used to living in the conditions of a “*full world*” which has such features as a big population, degrading environment and limited natural resources.⁴⁶ The proximity of the turning point when the limits of extensive growth have been reached was one of the main messages of the Club of Rome ever since the earliest years of its activity in the 1970s as reflected in the report *The Limits to Growth*⁴⁷ and further developed in the new report *Come on, Capitalism*.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the world economy and the world in general continue to develop within the model of the *empty world* even though practically everything indicates the need of a paradigm shift.⁴⁹ However, the required paradigm shift demands serious efforts, including making changes of our ways of thinking. The world needs a *coherent policy* which will be ready to comprehend the world as a whole, pursuing social, economic, ecological and various other purposes – something that mankind is not yet ready to do.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Boulding, Kenneth E. *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*. New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964.

⁴⁵ Rome, Adam. “Sustainability: the launch of spaceship earth,” *Nature*, Vol. 527, Issue 7579, 2015, pp. 443-445. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://www.nature.com/articles/527443a>>.

⁴⁶ Daly, Herman E. “Economics in a full world,” *Scientific American*, September 2005, pp. 100-107. Access 09 April 2018 <[http://www.steadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/Daly_SciAmerican_FullWorldEconomics\(1\).pdf](http://www.steadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/Daly_SciAmerican_FullWorldEconomics(1).pdf)>.

⁴⁷ Meadows Donella H, Dennis L. Meadows, Jürgen Randers J, William W. Behrens III. *The limits to growth*. New York, NY: Universe Books, 1972. Access 09 April 2018 <<http://www.donellameadows.org/wp-content/userfiles/Limits-to-Growth-digital-scan-version.pdf>>.

⁴⁸ Weizsäcker and Wijkman, *Come On!*

⁴⁹ Turner, G. and Alexander, C. “Limits to growth was right. New research shows we’re nearing collapse,” *The Guardian*, 2 September 2014. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/02/limits-to-growth-was-right-new-research-shows-we-re-nearing-collapse>>.

⁵⁰ Weizsäcker and Wijkman, *Come On*, p. 50.

Making sense of the ways of mankind's escape from these deadlocks proposed by the philosophy of the empty world demands creating a new narrative which has to succeed neo-liberalism and push mankind to the edge of a crash. The new narrative has to emphasize respect for human dignity, justice thus reminding, once again, that people survive only when they are able to get organized around public benefits.⁵¹ The new narrative could provide ways to live a worthwhile life under conditions of ecological restrictions, to satisfy the main needs of people and provide equality sufficient for maintaining social stability and security.⁵²

In 1991, Alexander King and Bertrán Schneider introduced the notions *problématique* and *résolutive* in *The First Global Revolution*⁵³ to define ways of responding to the threats and challenges of the full world. Authors saw an opportunity for mankind to change its course of development and to unite due to the identification of a new “general enemy” at the end of the Cold War. As such, there was the *problématique* of ecological degradation and global warming, poverty, excessive military expenses and deficiency of resources. *Good governance* – another key notion of the book – is, according to the authors, the main *résolutive* component opposing the common enemy.⁵⁴

Forming a new balance between national and global governance is one of the most important elements of transition to the full world philosophy. Achieving such a balance will demand specification of the notion of national sovereignty in relation to the realities of the world as a whole since the existing comprehension of state sovereignty is a product of the empty world. The European Union can be an example of such changes when there is a transfer of some share of national sovereign rights to the alliance and to the mutual benefits of all its member states.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Eisler, Riane. (2008). *The real wealth of nations. Creating a caring economics, 2nd ed.* San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.

⁵² Weizsäckerand Wijkman, *Come On*, p. 108.

⁵³ King, Alexander and Bertrand Schneider. (1991). *The first global revolution. A report by the Council of the Club of Rome.* New York, NY: Pantheon Books. Access 09 April 2018 <http://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/documents/TheFirstGlobalRevolution_text.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Weizsäckerand Wijkman, *Come On*, p. 68.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

Thus, the philosophy of nation states as a product of the empty world needs revision and legal instruments of *global governance* need to be added to it.⁵⁶ Here Paul Raskin's approach presented in *Great Transition*⁵⁷ is worth mentioning. Raskin allocates three possible routes of further development of humanity; conventional, barbarization and Great Transition. Each of these trends, in turn, offers two possible scenarios of the future.

According to Raskin, the mechanisms of pure market economy and reforms that invite weak intervention carried out for the best intentions but by weak politicians will lead to barbarization or extremely disturbing consequences. Great Transition gives a chance to pass to a planetary phase – *One World and Many Places* – with governance based on the “principle of restrained pluralism.”⁵⁸ According to this principle, wasteful consumption and population density have to be limited, international trade has to be stabilized while education, spiritual life and social justice are to become our priorities. At present, the Great Transition is undoubtedly merely a dream, but – keeping the alternative of barbarization in mind – it is a necessary one.⁵⁹

4. Outlines of the New Uniform European Security System

The most important function of any government is ensuring the safety of citizens and creating an environment promoting confidence in the future. These duties are most often reflected in the concept of security where values and interests, as well as main objectives and means through which to achieve these goals are formulated. This is correct not only for certain states, but also for Europe in general. At the same time, it is necessary to realize that the reasons of instability of the modern security environment are complex, and, as a result, they demand forming multidimensional responses focused on achieving the objectives of security policy and not on

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 204.

⁵⁷ Raskin, Paul. (2016). *Journey to Earthland. The great transition to planetary civilization*. Boston, MA: Tellus Institute. Access 09 April 2018 <<http://greattransition.org/documents/Journey-to-Earthland.pdf>>.

⁵⁸ Paul Raskin. *Journey to Earthland...*, pp. 84-67.

⁵⁹ Weizsäcker and Wijkman, *Come On*, p. 207.

eliminating the already emerging threats.⁶⁰ Action must be preventive and proactive, and not merely reflexive.

The creation of a common space of security in Europe and a new European security system requires specifying a set of questions. What is understood as European security in the 21st century and what is the contribution of Europe to global security? What are the threats to Europe? How does the perception of security by Europeans have to change? How are ties between internal and external security understood and structured? How are Europe's efforts in the sphere of defence interfaced to strengthening the role of the NATO? What can be the forms of cooperation between Europe and the regions forming its security environment?

The process of developing a new concept of European security demands re-structuring of the European space. It is possible to urgently allocate the following poles and loci of a uniform European space for security processes.

The European Union

The concept of European security assumes a transformation of the EU into a power center realizing its specific features. Long-term European security has to be comprehensive and complete as military-political means and power are to be applied within wide frameworks covering all elements of national power and the sphere of public life at the level of both goals and tools. Thus, one can state that the EU has a wide range of tools the effective usage of which “would make the European Union a formidable actor in the international community.”⁶¹

We can talk of consensus when it comes to the idea that European values lay at the corner stone of the concept of European security as they “stand for the respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of

⁶⁰ Egmont Papers 1. *A European Security Concept for the 21st Century*, p. 9.

⁶¹ House of Lords European Union Committee. *Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy*. 8th Report of Session 2015-16, HL Paper 97, London: The Stationery Office Limited, 16 February 2016, p. 38. Access 09 April 2018 <<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldecom/97/97.pdf>>.

law and human rights.” The values of the EU are an element of its power as a global actor, and if the EU is not seen as a power compassionate to common people in other parts of the world, its efficiency would be “drastically reduced.”⁶² However, the new concept of European security must be balanced and pragmatically spread European values outside the EU. On the one hand, to achieve institutional and structural reforms the EU has to work with existing political structures. On the other, any intervention and action – even if driven by the best intentions – can lead to negative consequences, for example, to the strengthening the authoritarian regimes.⁶³

However, the new concept of security has to clearly define its priorities and threats since; despite decades of cooperation, it cannot be assumed that there already is clarity on these issues. Moreover, EU member states are not inclined to adopt difficult decisions in this field. Moreover, geographic projections of the EU member states differ, as well. For example, the states in Central and Eastern Europe consider Russia a priority, Mediterranean ones are more concerned about Africa and the Middle East, while Great Britain, France and Germany have global perspectives. Defining priorities for the EU as a whole will demand a revision of the EU’s role at the global arena and, here, European states have differing diplomatic experience and different ambitions on whether or not to participate in shaping the EU’s foreign policy. Along with France and Germany, one may mention Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Denmark as the states that are engaged in “active diplomacy” and would like to see “a very active European Union in the field of foreign policy.”⁶⁴

Besides, the EU as a power centre has to have the ability of independent decision-making based on effective mechanisms, first of all, at a state of crises and/or conflicts.⁶⁵ Unanimous decision-making protects the member states and unanimity in foreign policy has been “the ultimate safeguard written into the treaties. Not even the smallest EU member can be overrid-

⁶² House of Lords EU Committee, *Europe in the world...*, p. 30.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁶⁵ Egmont Papers 1. *A European Security Concept for the 21st Century*, p. 7.

den by a majority vote.”⁶⁶ On the other hand, there is a risk that unanimous decision-making will interfere with demonstrating determination in foreign and security policy. Thus, it is possible to talk of institutional conflicts within the EU regarding the decision-making process in foreign and security policy. The existing literature does not yet define how such conflicts manifest in EU institutions and how fault lines between European institutions and national interests of member states are to be drawn.⁶⁷

To perform the role of an actor on the international arena it is not enough to be aware of the developing processes, follow the policy of super powers, etc. The EU will be influential if member states express clear will to become a pole of the multi-polar world.⁶⁸ However, at present there are disagreements concerning whether the EU should be a full-fledged geopolitical actor.⁶⁹

Karen Smith, a professor of International relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, sees distinctions between being a global actor and pursuing a *global foreign and security policy*. For example, the EU pursues a global trade policy and, in this sense, is a global actor. However, this does not mean that “particularly given the challenges around [the EU], that it should have a global foreign policy.” Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer of European Security, Aberystwyth University considers that the EU is “a global power”, but “not an actor of global security.” In the sphere of security, the EU is more concentrated on regional and not global problems.⁷⁰ As a result, the new concept of security in the medium run has to concentrate on the neighbourhood.

The USA, NATO and Transatlantic Relations

In the architecture of the new European security system the US will retain an important place. The dominating role of the US in the NATO leads to

⁶⁶ House of Lords European Union Committee. *Europe in the world*, p. 43.

⁶⁷ Giannessi, *Europe in a Changing Global Order*, p. 4.

⁶⁸ Egmont Papers 1. *A European Security Concept for the 21st Century*, p. 5.

⁶⁹ House of Lords European Union Committee. *Europe in the world*, p. 19.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

the fact that possibilities to change the institutions of European security depend on preserving, increasing or restraining America's role. Russia considers the role of the US dominating in Europe and argues that it must be decreased. The majority of the European NATO member states considers America's role extremely important for providing continental security and would like to keep it stable and even expand it. On the other hand, the supporters of a more effective EU acknowledge that the dominant position of the US in the NATO interferes with the posture of Europe's own defence system. In other words, American presence in Europe is both a stabilizing factor within the NATO framework and a dividing one in relations with Russia.⁷¹ The functions and role of Russia in the European security system have been discussed in detail above as part of the consideration of the Russian challenge to European security.

Intermarium

A substantial part of security threats in Europe is tied to the space located between the EU and Russia which can be called *Intermarium*⁷² or the "land in-between."⁷³ In this space, there are states united by a metrics, logic and grammar of geopolitics and sharing some common features. For example, structural weaknesses – including political instability, fragility of the rule of law, economic instability, hidden or apparent instability of various nature – are characteristic of all the states of *Intermarium*. Potential or open conflicts and unrecognized states used by geopolitical and regional centres for projecting power and influence are also present here. For example, the contest for influence is waged not only by the West and Russia, but also by Turkey – an important actor both in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region. Iran is another important actor in the South Caucasus as it traditionally has a great share of influence in Azerbaijan and is an important partner of Armenia. The deployment of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative is increas-

⁷¹ Alcaro, *Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe*, p. 32.

⁷² Umland, Andreas and Fedorenko, Konstantyn. "How to solve Ukraine's Security Dilemma? The Idea of an *Intermarium* Coalition in East-Central Europe," *War on the Rocks*, 30 August 2017. Access 12 February 2019. <<https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/>>.

⁷³ Alcaro, *Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe*, p. 29.

ing China's influence as she envelops communication and cultural projects in the South Caucasus and pursues a free credit policy in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

State elite in *Intermarium* use the geopolitical antagonism of power centres to receive advantages and preserve their power by adapting their policies to the results of power centre clashes.⁷⁴ It means that the countries of the region cannot be considered passive objects. They are, to a certain extent, capable of influencing the strategy and policies of power centres. *Intermarium* states do not regard Europe as the one and only uniform security space.

Acknowledgment of the importance of *Intermarium* and the wide neighbourhood can already be seen in the *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* of 2016 as it departs from the concept of "European Neighbourhood Policy." Though the term is mentioned several times in the document, conceptually it is replaced by the concept of resiliency as EU's new guideline principle for the relations between member states and the neighbourhood and emphasizes tailored approaches to certain countries. The new strategy refuses to consider the European external environment a coherent space to which the same tools and approaches can be applied.⁷⁵

This emphasis on resiliency which is defined as "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crisis"⁷⁶ is important as it admits that readiness for reforms is necessary for positive changes. The strategy departs from the idealistic approach of the concept of "European Neighbourhood Policy" which is based upon the assumption that a common strategy of transformation for all countries is possible and that governments of the states in the neighbourhood really want reforms.

At present, the resources and capacities of Europe are connected with its ability to assist in carrying out economic reforms, and improving and/or

⁷⁴ Alcaro, *Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe*, p. 29.

⁷⁵ Techau, *The EU's New Global Strategy*.

⁷⁶ A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, *Shared Vision, Common Action*, p. 23.

deeply reforming political, judicial, as well as security institutions of the *Intermarium* states. And it is necessary to understand that in *Intermarium* and the wide neighbourhood, where authoritarian regimes, wide economic inequality, unrecognized, fragile and failing states, as well as grey and black zones are present, responses to threats of the security environment cannot be formed only on the basis of resources and capacities of the EU/West.⁷⁷

Conclusion

The European security system will be built on the basis of three poles – the EU, Russia, and the USA – and *Intermarium* which in the medium run cannot be considered a pole. Distinctions between the EU and the USA in the system seem insignificant in comparison with the divergences between the West and Russia, however they do exist and can become important as they raise the role and influence of Russia and other actors in *Intermarium*.

The multi-polar nature of the European security system makes the intense relations between its actors inevitable. And the methods to decrease the risk of destabilization in the system are tied not to reducing the quantity of poles but to strengthening the interaction between them thus creating the conditions necessary to restrain the congenital instability of the system. In the medium run, the evolution of the European security system towards the creation of a common security space would allow to create the conditions necessary for managing the tension between the poles, the states of *Intermarium* and the wide neighbourhood.

Moreover, the relations between the poles surpass the European continent. The USA and Russia interact on the global arena, and the relations of the USA and the EU in security issues are institutionalized within the NATO which is also carrying out a global role in the 21st century. As a result, managing the tension and confrontations between the West and Russia in Europe inevitably go beyond the Continent's limits and potentially can get especially sharp in *Intermarium*. Besides, the tensions in North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and Iran play an important role, as well.

⁷⁷ House of Lords European Union Committee. *Europe in the world*, p. 36.

Thus, efforts to strengthen European security have to be based on clear long-term strategic objectives. Reactive and short-term efforts can only provide limited results, without touching upon the prime causes of crises and conflicts. For this purpose, a general political will and awareness of shared European responsibility and destiny is required.