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ENGLISH MONEY IN SOUTH AFRICA.



THE United Kingdom is stirred to its depths when it has to provide a war credit of £10,000,000; and this not because there has been the least hesitation of will or doubt as to ability to pay, but merely because, of all other attributes, that which rules—and may it long rule—the nation, is a close scrutiny of the national till. It is this eye to business which enables the nation to enjoy its persistent indulgence in purely charitable outlay. It is always in funds, just as is the careful shopkeeper. But occasionally the nation is led on to forget the totals to which perpetual outlay of minor sums in any given direction commits it.

Having but just returned from a prolonged visit to the various districts of South Africa, I came back convinced that neither South Africans nor the home-keeping public at all realize the great total of the minor sums from time to time paid away in South Africa by the home tax-payer. The various native wars alone have cost very many millions, and as I write, at the least £100,000 of English taxes is still being paid each month to assert English supremacy in Bechuana-land. Englishmen at home do not forget that when we took over the Cape Colony from the Dutch, eighty years ago, we advanced to the Dutch some £8,000,000, in return for which they handed over their colonies at the Cape and in what is now British Guiana. Since then, on frequent occasions the English Government has afforded financial assistance; as this last spring, when the Cape Ministry found themselves unable to extend the railway system up to Kimberley, it advanced the necessary £400,000 at the very low rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. It is true that the Government, in introducing the measure into the House of Commons, had the questionable grace to say that this liberality to a colony was only undertaken

because the colony had tried but failed to obtain the money, whereas the completion of the railway would mean the saving to the Imperial Exchequer of £2,000 a month for as long as the Bechuana-land expedition remained in the country. This last was a remarkable reason to give, seeing that the railway could not be completed much before Christmas ; whereas every soldier was to be out of Bechuanaland by November. Nor did the Imperial Government heed the advice given them, that there were local influences at work which made it agreeable even if not necessary, for the Cape Government to find itself unable to obtain the money. Local politicians knew well the local political value of a snub to Kimberley, as well as of the support of those who are now reaping so very considerable a harvest as " transport-riders " or carriers between Kimberley and the present railway terminus at the Orange River. But, however this may be, the generous aid of the Home Government has had a most wholesome and widespread effect for good in South Africa ; and it will, as it were, compel the Cape Colony to push forward its own best interests by thus completing the main trunk line of railway so far into the interior, and right up to so important a commercial centre as Kimberley. There have been sundry other contributions, such as the £90,000 paid to the Orange Free State in compensation for the annexation of Griqualand West. Altogether, neither Englishmen at home nor Englishmen or Dutchmen in the Cape Colony should forget that the many millions expended in the original purchase and subsequent protection and improvement of the English South African settlements are millions that must be kept in mind as by no means thoughtlessly squandered, but permanently entered in the " capital account " of the English nation.

Besides all this, there has been, since the English took over South Africa, at the least £25,000,000 of English money invested in the Government securities of the Cape Colony and Natal, while in various private enterprises there is invested in fixed and floating capital an amount that it is difficult to gauge, but which is certainly to be counted in tens of millions. On all this, it may be said, the English investor has only a right to expect punctual payment of interest ; but he is naturally also eager as to the rate of that interest, and is therefore ever anxious to do what he can to promote South African prosperity.

I thus allude to the money standard by which nowadays all property is measured, in order to show how large is the material stake of the English nation in South Africa. In England itself these facts are apt to be ignored, because transactions there are so gigantic that South Africa takes but one thirty-fifth of the capital in work, and about one-fortieth of the external trade. But although there are in England but few, comparatively speaking, directly connected with South

Africa, there is no reason for supposing that South Africa (where nearly all the externally supplied capital is English, and seventeenth-twentieths of the external trade done with England) can get along very well by itself.

South Africans, and especially those few who conscientiously hope for independence, would do well to ponder over a few obvious questions, such as: Where would the Cape Colony and Natal have been had not the English taxpayer freely and perpetually paid for "little" Kafir and Zulu wars, not even grudging millions at a time? Where would the colonists have obtained at so low a price, or indeed at all, the £25,000,000 of capital that have given them their network of railways and their harbours, such as they are, and docks and bridges? (The Transvaal and Free State cannot obtain loans in Europe, because financial people know well that, being independent States, they may at any moment, and legally, "repudiate" payment of interest or repayment of capital, a thing impossible in an English colony.) Where would have been the traders but for support from houses and capitalists at home? Where would have been the self-government and large political liberty enjoyed for so long by the Europeans in South Africa, except for the kindly supremacy and protection of England? Much is said of loyalty in South Africa, but if South Africans wish to be loyal to their own interests and welfare, they will be loyal to the British connection, and seek to maintain their present proud position as a worthy and vigorous portion of the great British Empire.

What I wish, however, specially to urge in this article is, that the English taxpayer and elector at home should give renewed and definite attention to South Africa, whether on the score of the many millions he has already invested or expended there, or of the millions he may yet find himself willing to pay, to carry out his self-imposed championship of humanity, or his national duty of ultimate guardian of every acre of soil of the wide British Empire.

In South Africa, as elsewhere, politics control the expenditure of money, and also the profits on investments; and in South Africa, for the purposes of this article, we may conveniently divide all things under the two heads, White and Black policy. I hope under these divisions to set out, in brief, deductions made from long study, as well as recent inquiry on the spot, as to what can and should be done in South Africa to secure a better and more economical prosperity for both Europeans and natives in that part of the empire.

First, then, as to such policy or political action as concerns itself with the Europeans in South Africa. We have first of all the men themselves, and then their natural environments, and then their works, and finally the political conditions under which they work.

It will be well, *in limine*, to tabulate relative numbers:—

COLONY OR DISTRICT.	Total Natives.	Total Europeans.	Original Europeans.	Immigrant Europeans.
Cape Colony	950,000	320,000	174,000	146,000
Transkei territories	270,000	10,000	4,000	6,000
Basutoland	140,000	500	...	500
Natal	400,000	31,000	15,000	16,000
Bechuanaland	250,000	1,000	400	600
Totals	2,010,000	362,500	193,400	169,100

I use the term "original Europeans" to denote the descendants of families already settled in South Africa when first it became an English possession in the beginning of this century—both those of the old Dutch stock and the representatives of that great Huguenot exodus who introduced into South Africa so many sturdy, frugal, and high-principled families. It will be observed that the English dominions in South Africa are inhabited by 360,000 persons of European stock, and about 2,000,000 natives. Nor may it be forgotten that on the immediate frontiers northwards are millions of native races, for the most part independent, but in the Free State and Transvaal controlled by about 100,000 Europeans, of whom 80,000 are of the original stock, and about 20,000 English.

The two main circumstances of this peculiar distribution of population are the relations between black and white, and those between British and Boer. The former I will deal with subsequently; in regard to the latter we face the most unfortunate of the circumstances connected with South Africa. There is radical difference of sentiment and character between the two races, and the necessity of compromising these differences in administration has weakened, and at times disastrously weakened, the action of the government of the day or place.

In South Africa I found it rather the fashion to throw all the blame of this unfortunate race antagonism on Mr. Gladstone for his "Majuba surrender." But on all hands I also found evidence that, although Majuba undoubtedly embittered relations, these had been previously strained from the very first inauguration of British rule. Those conversant with South African history will not need to be reminded of the Slaughter's Nek hanging, or of the method of compensating for slaves, as earlier instances quite as invariably and strongly appealed to as Majuba.

The real fact is, this race antagonism is coeval with the coming in of the supremacy of English ideas and English character, but fruitfully grafted on to the bitter hostility of the Dutch free colonists to the rule of the Dutch East India Company; and it is an unfortunate antagonism, having nothing in common with wholesome race competition, and being wholly evil in its effects.

Sir Bartle Frere, bringing a wealth of experience to bear on the local needs of South Africa, saw at once that this antagonism must be put an end to; and he saw this could be done by a due admixture of conciliation and courageous firmness. Doctrinaire prejudice in high places in England failed altogether to appreciate such true statesmanship, and the consequence was the great political crime of the whole Majuba episode, which destroyed the very material advances towards a new and permanent harmony between Boer and English which had resulted from the indefatigable and wise labours of Sir Bartle Frere.

There is a great deal that is most excellent in the Boer composition, and I speak from considerable personal experience. I use the term Boer as the term in popular acceptation, including all Afrikanders of those families the English found already in occupation when they took over the country. Most people have read of their peculiar characteristics, varying from the descriptions of them as colonizing Calvinists, Bible in hand, proclaiming themselves commanded, as if by men of God of old, to go into the land of the South African natives and possess it, and to expel the Canaanites and the Hivites and the Jebusites, obeying the comfortable behest, "Ye shall make no covenant with them, nor show any mercy unto them: the Lord hath given the land for an inheritance to you and to your children;"—to the descriptions which alternately describe them as all that is ignorant and lying, and all that is persevering and hospitable.

I was told, and that more than once, that I should leave South Africa with the impression that Truth hardly found a congenial atmosphere in South Africa; but after seeing something at all events of all classes, I unhesitatingly set down this sweeping generalization to puerile vexation of spirit, and to inexperience of any other similar communities. To my thinking it is entirely unjustified, but as it was asserted by South Africans themselves, I was left in the well-known dilemma in which the Greeks found themselves when "Epimenides the Cretan said, All Cretans are liars." I found the same to be the case with the many other general condemnations passed against all things, persons, and places South African.

The chief fault I have to find with the Boer is, that he does not succeed in making himself prosperous, and is, in addition, a drag on the prosperity of his neighbours. He is the firm enemy of all co-operation; he has that fatalistic religious bias that has led him on occasion to declare it impious to make dams where God has seen fit to provide but little water; and although I have suggested to such Boers that in principle it must be just as impious for the Boer daily to make water hot in order that he should drink his favourite coffee, seeing that Providence saw fit to supply only cold water, none the less these peculiarities of character make the Boer

little able to make the best use for himself of his surroundings. There are of course exceptions; but as a rule the Boer is slow to act, averse from change, greedy of land, disdainfully ignorant. Several wine-growers complained grievously that their wine had no sale in Europe. I replied, "Yes; but then your wine is not suited to the European taste." They quietly and proudly answered, "It is wine we all drink and like; if it is not to the taste of the European market, so much the worse for the market." But the "coo" argument is two-edged, and fails to get them a remunerative price. I have said they are independent and greedy of land. Their one ambition is to buy up large areas of soil, but they refuse to cultivate except as a last resort. Only the other day a Boer farmer in the west suddenly gave up a large area of cultivation. His neighbours asked him why? and the reply came, "Because now I have paid off all my debts." The experience of easily making sufficient to pay off heavy debts was no incentive to continue thus to accumulate wealth, and a valuable agricultural area lapses again into wilderness, "preserved" against all cultivators. Boer "farming" is, in a word, *Latifundia* run to seed. Enormous areas of land are bought up, but in place of hard-worked slaves, and agriculture, and herds of cattle and swine, there are neither stock, crops, nor labourers; and all is, as it were, a pastoral wilderness. The political influence of this peculiar race of people resists, and often only too successfully, the introduction of improvements or facilities that have been proved by experience in other similar lands to insure success and prosperity. The Boer element needs a great reforming, whether by leavening of other blood or by the friction process of competition, if the Boers are to be commonly prosperous.

This latter process of friction day by day increases. Nearly all land is more or less mortgaged, and the mortgagees are but rarely Boers. It is true that nearly every Boer religiously retains a nest-egg of ready cash, in cases amounting to several hundred pounds; but when he wishes for any capital to expend upon his land, he pledges the land as security. Many Boers thus feel, in a measure, under the thumb of the English, and this threatening of their independence urges them perpetually to look for new lands of those Canaanites who are still outside the frontiers of the protecting British. Consequently we find them, even during the last few months—vainly in Bechuanaland, but successfully at Thabanchu and in Zululand—driving the native tribes off their own lands.

In other ways also the English in South Africa are quietly getting the upper hand. But in the Cape Colony is painfully evident their main fault—and it is for them a highly injurious fault—namely, a perpetual self-depreciation, a perpetual running down of their colony, their men, their climate, and all that is theirs: a fault

group of black races, comprising the Basuto, Ba-rolong, Ba-kwana, Ba-mangwato, and other Bechuana tribes, of less physical power, armed chiefly with throwing spears, much given to agriculture as well as to keeping stock, and taking readily to European dress and the use of other European articles.

The brown Bushmen are a race to themselves. They are the South African representatives of a weird savage civilization which seems to have existed in its own perfection before it was overrun by the more modern savage races. There were representatives in New Zealand who were utterly destroyed when the Maoris first arrived. The favourite arm of the Bushmen is the bow and arrow, and as the latter was often poisoned, the pioneer colonists entertained a holy horror of these tribes, and it was only the introduction of firearms, that eventually drove them from their mountain fastnesses until now they are merely the disappearing remnant of a race dwelling away in the little-known western deserts. It is the only race in South Africa which shows any artistic ability, and their rock paintings, so common in South Africa, prove them to have been, even up to recent years, masters both of drawing and of colour. Many travellers have recorded the remarkable fact that a knowledge of practical surgery and medicine, widespread among all members of these tribes, puts to the blush our own much vaunted systems of popular education. The Bushman language is classed inflectionally with the Basque, Fin, &c. These tribes exhibit a haughty aversion from the trammels and toils of our Western civilization. They refuse to assist in any labour, with the exception of any form of sporting or hunting, and in this they are as zealous, as persevering, and as knowing as the keenest of English sportsmen.

The Hottentots, on the other hand, appear to be a negroid race of inferior organization and weak powers; but they have this in common with the Bushmen, that they are rapidly dwindling in numbers. The half-bred Griquas are a race descended from Boer fathers and Hottentot mothers, which has spread in small bands over most of Western South Africa, and attempts, but with small success, an imitation of European manners, language, and dress.

Within the frontiers of European supremacy there are probably half a million of the "Ama" tribes and a million of the "Ba" tribes; while another half-million is composed of Hottentots, Bushmen, Griquas, Indian Coolies, Malays, and other "native" descendants of freed slaves. In regard to numbers, although under favourable conditions the blacks thrive and increase, conditions very speedily become unfavourable. It is a commonplace with anthropologists, as well as with European and even local political speakers and writers, to point out that the natives of South Africa are an exception to the general rule, that "savage" races dwindle before civilization. A better

acquaintance with the actual facts proves, however, that the blacks of South Africa are no exception to the general rule. They die out whenever they come face to face with civilization; whenever, that is, they come into competition with the interests or the labour of white men. Two causes are, however, at work in South Africa which prevent this effect from becoming readily or everywhere apparent. The main cause is the continuous immigration of blacks from outside. There may be two millions within the frontiers of the South African States, but there are many millions immediately across those frontiers, from whose ranks are coming perennial streams of immigrants to enjoy the advantages and rewards of civilized life. In Natal this influx is reversing the usual South African order of events, in which the white encroaches on the lands of the native, for the native is here begging for lands from the white. In Griqualand West there is continual incursion of blacks to earn wages as labourers in the diamond-fields; and all along the frontier line immigration is proceeding. Another cause is the policy, pursued in its entirety in Natal and to a very great extent in Cape Colony, of assigning certain lands as native locations. There are many such districts scattered over both colonies; and outside the colonial borders we have such "protected" areas as Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and the Transkei territories. In all such districts the black man does not come into direct contact with civilization; but he is at the same time restrained from the Malthusian check of war. As a rule he obtains abundance of food, and the consequence is, he thrives exceedingly. This is all very good for trade, as with prosperity there grows up a desire for European manufactures. It is said that in Basutoland, when we first took over the country in 1869, there was not a trader's shop in the whole territory, but ten years of our rule had induced a "foreign" trade valued at actually half a million sterling per annum.

Even in these protected districts, however, healthy and natural increase is endangered by drink and disease, both apparently increasing with sad rapidity. Nothing seems to stay the spread of drink, and the evils are painfully apparent in the wide Cape Colony. There the native in many districts is on an equal footing with any other inhabitant, and can obtain what drink he will; in all such districts he is rapidly decreasing in numbers. Indeed, in South Africa, as elsewhere, it is evident that, once the native comes into actual competition with whites, or into direct contact with an advancing civilization, he dies out.

Naturally the great interest in the question as to the increase or decrease of the black, centres in the fact of whether or no he can properly supply the demand for labour for these colonies. At the Diamond Fields he has done so, acquiring even a liking for steady work at wages; but it seems unfortunately only too true that when

he resides for generations among the whites he loses these qualities, and refuses to work except just when he wishes to indulge in some special expenditure. As labourers, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, blacks are good as herds and in the charge of stock, but for manual labour they are indolent and careless to a degree. You may give them as exact and full instructions as you will, but they will not carry them out, unless, as one farmer put it, "you have an overseer to every labourer."

This rapid dying out of the black in any settled district is one important feature of the present position. It is true that in very many individual cases natives rise above their traditions and become owners of land and houses and cattle. The franchise is open to them, and this has had an excellent effect in stimulating natives, in order to acquire the right to its exercise, to accumulate property of an annual value of £25, or earn wages to an annual amount of £50. In some constituencies the native vote is one of the most important. But these nobler aspirations are the exception, and relatively too weak to counterbalance physical decadence—even unto death.

In the native locations indolence and surreptitious drinking have full play, and the consequence is, that in unfavourable seasons there is scarcity of food, and stock-stealing becomes rife. Further afield, as in Basutoland or the Transkei, where there is less control, drink, disease, theft, and even armed quarrelling, are always present, and just now sadly on the increase. The recent Cape Government Commission on the Liquor Traffic placed on record most distressing accounts, nor were they able to suggest any remedy for the sad state of affairs within the Cape Colony proper. Prohibition is urgently recommended for all *native* districts and dependencies. But the evils are painted in strong terms:—

"The Commission has been deeply impressed with the emphatic and urgent representations contained in nearly all the evidence taken, and especially from the natives themselves, on the evils arising out of the sale and consumption of strong drinks. All this evidence points in the clearest way to the use of spirituous liquors (chiefly ardent spirits, the produce of the distilleries) as an unmitigated evil to the native races, and that no other cause or influence so directly increases idleness and crime, and is so completely destructive, not only of all progress or improvement, but even of the reasonable hope of any progress or improvement . . . if unchecked, it can only have one result, and *that is the entire destruction of that portion of the natives who acquire the taste for brandy*. All the better class of natives, and even the heathen and uneducated portion, appear to be conscious of this, and have implored the Commission to suppress the evil, which is bringing ruin on themselves and their country."

Disease and theft unfortunately follow close on the heels of drink, and famine succeeds for a certainty. This is occurring now on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, throwing on our fellow-citizens in that part of the empire a fresh burden of anxiety and expense.

Moreover, the native is slow to forget his former life of perpetual warfare, and his fighting instincts are dormant, not dead. In Natal and the two Boer States the natives are practically without arms, and their squabbles, it is thought, can be easily quelled. This is due to internal legislation. But in Bechuanaland, the Cape Colony, and Basutoland, the natives are armed. The endeavours of the Cape Colony to stop the importation of arms were not only successfully evaded, but led the natives to place a wildly fictitious value on the possession of arms. They were ready to do anything and to undergo any sacrifice for this one fond purpose. In addition to this, the Cape Government neutralized all its years of effort in this direction by allowing firearms to be given in lieu of wages to men working on the railway extensions. It is said on excellent authority that not less than half a million of guns and rifles thus passed very quickly into the possession of the Caffres. One result of this strange Government action was the lamentable Basuto war. Other results have been fatal fights and squabbles among the natives themselves. In England it would be well to take to heart the fact, that in South Africa total prohibition of the sale of liquor or of firearms has not only failed altogether, but positively set a new value on those forbidden fruits. It is clearly evident that a more rational system, which would set on foot really rational restrictions, can alone succeed.

It will be well, before summing up the evils of the present position, briefly to describe the native policy adopted respectively by the Boer Governments, and our own Colonies of Natal and the Cape.

The Dutch system has bad as well as good points. The natives are regarded as inferiors, and their title to their own country as altogether worthless. It supports, for instance, the trekking of a force of Boers into any native country to seize upon large areas of soil under the name of farms. Sometimes the "trekkers" assist some native chief in his local squabbles, and claim from him the lands of his foes; in others the lands even of the entertaining chief are appropriated. In all cases ultimately the Boer farmer becomes possessed of new and extensive lands. Afterwards the main object is to reduce to a minimum of those actually required to do the small labour of stock-minding, the number of natives living on each farm. The remainder of the natives are forced to leave the district. A great instance of the Dutch native policy has occurred quite recently in the Free State. One portion of old Basutoland became possessed by some Barolongs under their chief Moroko, who left two sons, Sepinaar and Samuel—sons, that is, according to Caffre custom; for the Caffre, with a wisdom exceeding that of Europeans, maintains that actual descent can only be traced to the mother. These two chiefs were sons of Moroko's "first" wife. There was a dispute for the chieftainship, and both agreed to abide by the decision of the Free State President as arbitrator.

He, finding that Samuel was son of the wife only some years after the father's death, gave judgment in favour of Sepinaar, who entered on his inheritance. Sepinaar last winter was murdered—it is asserted—by Samuel's party. The Free State territory surrounds this Native territory, and no sooner is this chief put an end to than the Free State steps in and proclaims this Native territory to be Free State territory. At once the whole system of greater and lesser chiefs and all other organizations of the Ba-rolong tribes are gone, and the natives all become equal in the eye of the Free State law—equal, that is, to one another, but altogether and hopelessly subordinate to the interests and needs of the Boers. The immediate practical effect is a forced exodus of large numbers of natives out of their own territory, and in the course of a few years all the Ba-rolong lands will have become Boer farms, and the Ba-rolongs of Moroko become merely historical. The Free State Boers do not deign to explain what *right* they have to the lands of a tribe simply because its chief was murdered. It seems that the international ethics of Europe have no hold on the Boer. On their farms, the Boers appear to treat well the few natives they allow there, even though severity is independently exercised against the refractory. But the strict Boer system soon strips a country of its natives. This system has had full and free play in the Free State, and is to be seen there in all its perfection. In that State the numbers of natives and Europeans are about equal. But then the Boer requires hardly any hired labour in his peculiar system of so-called farming. In a word, the native policy adopted in the Boer States is “get rid of all natives we cannot actually use as labourers.”

We have also two distinct systems of native policy pursued in our two Colonies of Natal and the Cape. In the Cape Colony natives live either in native locations or outside. In the one case they come under special laws and regulations well fitted to promote their prosperity, but too frequently rendered nugatory by the opportunities for illicit drinking. In the other case the natives are simply on the ordinary footing of other citizens of the colony, capable of all rights and advantages open to white men. But then on its borders the Cape Colony attempts to maintain a Native empire, which governs the natives by special regulations and under Cape officials. This is a costly system, and it is difficult to see where exactly the Cape is the gainer. The pleasures of empire over Basutoland have cost the colony a debt of £4,000,000. Mr. Merriman told the House of Assembly the other day that attempting to rule the Transkei had already cost the colony £765,000. From this costly luxury the colony reaps little profit, but runs considerable risk, as when it suffered virtual defeat when the 140,000 Basutos came suddenly and bitterly to oppose its behests. The fact is the Cape colonists are and

ought to remain busied about developing the resources of their own land, and to be called aside to this supplementary and gratuitous task of controlling natives outside their frontier is to be called aside from useful to useless work. As Sir Hercules Robinson not long ago reminded the Cape public,

“It was too much to expect that the colony when first started in the course of self-government could at the same time take upon itself the administration of populous native territories beyond its borders. In placing extensive native territories under the government of the majority for the time being in the popular branch of a Legislature in which these native territories are wholly unrepresented, the system has broken down. The colony has been obliged in consequence to restore Basutoland to the Imperial Government, and if it would in like manner see its way to free itself, at all events for a time, from the responsibility and burden of the Transkeian provinces, he should then look forward with great confidence to the future of the Cape.”

So too Mr. Froude, when speaking of the undesirability of making of South Africa one self-governing dominion, said, “Self-government in South Africa means the government of the natives by the European colonists, and not self-government . . . the Europeans, he did not doubt, would control the natives, but only by measures which Great Britain would never allow to be carried out in the Queen’s name.”

I claim to know something at all events of the men and measures that have made their mark in South African affairs, and I state as distinctly as words will allow that the public men of our English colonies are to the full as careful of the rights of the natives as the public men at home. It is true that their views occasionally lack that political perspective which can alone make clear that the personal needs of the colonists do occasionally come into collision with the just rights of the natives. But the great weak point is, that the forces at the disposal of the local European colonial community are very inferior to the native forces they have to control, and thus we have measures, such as the fatal Basuto Disarmament Act, which would not even suggest themselves to an administration having the Imperial forces at its back and under its immediate control. The fact is, the Cape system is not a success. It is a costly but unnecessary playing at empire, a useless burden and distraction for the Cape colonist. Commercially it endeavours to open to European trade native districts, but the goods that penetrate are mainly of European origin, and the task is thus one that may well be left to Imperial care. Indeed, the Cape colonist has a fair right to call on the Imperial Government to relieve him of the charge of neighbouring native areas, more especially as the strong humanitarian sympathy of the British public is ever on the watch to force the Imperial Government to interfere in all native concerns.

It was whispered to me in South Africa that a small—I believe very small—class, interested in pushing its own way, highly approves

of the present system, for the reason that it means periodical expeditions at the cost of the British exchequer. No doubt money is thus thrown into the colony. But is this gain not altogether swallowed up in the evils that necessarily accompany it? A South African war unsettles everybody and everything. Young men of all classes—barristers and clerks as well as porters and cabmen—all rush to the front; abnormal imports upset trade; a momentary, but in reality a fictitious, prosperity leads to over-confidence, unjustified expenditure, and inflated speculations; country districts are for the time denuded of supplies, and also of all means of carriage. In short, every industry and occupation is upset by the fighting fever, and by the unwholesome demands of a campaign. Thus, although there may be hundreds of thousands of pounds expended in the colony, more than hundreds of thousands are lost in this general *bouleversement* of all legitimate occupations and all systems of commerce and finance.

22205 In Natal the native policy is all in all, seeing that there are nearly 400,000 natives resident within the colony, although there are not 40,000 Europeans. The system there is to confine the natives to locations under native administration, although by placing in each a white magistrate and bringing all under the control of a special code of laws, the power of the chiefs is being gradually undermined, and European ideas of administration cautiously instilled into the native mind. Natives have, indeed, the liberty to leave their locations, and become full citizens of Natal, on equal footing with the whites; but to do this they must conform in all things, dress included, to European customs, and this the Zulu is very loth to do. The immediate consequences of this system has been a large increase in the numbers of natives, chiefly due to immigration. There is general contentment, and willing payment of a hut-tax of 14s. per hut. The system is only not a success in the two important facts that, on the one hand, there is risk of more Zulus entering Natal than there are lands to provide food for; and another, that some sudden fanaticism or mistake may lead to native outbreaks. The first of these eventualities can only be prevented by stopping immigration, as would be at once done were England to annex Zululand and reserve it for the Zulus. The second of these dangers is obviated, but only at great expense, by the maintenance of a very considerable garrison of Imperial troops.

The capacity of the natives, outside every European State, to govern themselves is limited by the power of interference the whites have. Any adventurer can at once foment a quarrel between two native tribes. He and his friends take one side, and, with this European aid, one if not two native "States" are speedily and simply put out of existence. Were it not for this illegitimate white interference

the natives would readily rule themselves. Even the chief Khame, whom I had the advantage of visiting with Sir Charles Warren in the far interior at his big town of Shoshong, 600 miles north of Kimberley, and actually in tropical Africa, carried on a most effective administration, suppressing crime and drunkenness with an unswerving hand, and encouraging education, the improvement of roads and advance in agriculture. But he lived in perpetual dread of this fatal, and apparently inevitable, interference on the part of white frontier adventurers, and was fain to beg the Queen's protectorate. The capacity for administration is hereditary with these chiefs, and the people are thoroughly obedient to their government. But the system is completely at the mercy of any white adventurer. And the one main fact that the practical statesman has to face in South Africa is the steady inevitable encroaching of the Europeans on the lands and independence of the native tribes. This would seem a proper province for the interference and aid of an empire whose beneficent rule has done so much for the well-being of native races.

It will thus be seen that the chief evils of the present system of native policy in South Africa are :—

1. That the Boer system means in result, whatever the motive, simply the extermination of the natives, and the appropriation of their lands by the whites.

2. That the various colonial systems mean an altogether unnecessary burdening of the colonies with the expenses, responsibilities, and risks of ruling natives, thus disastrously checking the growth of the colonies.

3. That, although with every variety of control, the natives under colonial rule are more and more becoming drunkards ; that crime and want are far too common ; and that the risk of rebellion is always present, and the colonial forces too weak to suppress a big rising.

4. That no permanent provision is made for protecting natives on the borders, who are ever subject to the marauding encroachments of white adventurers, who make the colonies their base for hostile operations.

5. That in consequence there are perpetual calls on the British taxpayer to make good acts of omission or commission in South Africa, with which his own Government has had no concern.

How to remedy all this is a problem which can only be solved, in the hopeful words of the new Secretary of State, by careful inquiry and anxious consideration. But solved it must be and that promptly.

Perhaps the most painful, but in another sense most reassuring, outcome of a full study of this problem is the conclusion that the present evils are distinctly the fault of nobody among permanent or local officials. They are the resultants of a variety of circumstances and forces ; they are, as it were, natural developments which can now be,

but could not have been before, dealt with in a complete and satisfactory manner.

The evils themselves are widely recognized, and remedies freely proposed. As a rule, these proposals are made in some particular crisis and the horizon of treatment is too confined. Few seem to know, for instance, that "the Cape" is only one of seven Governments in South Africa, independent of each other. Thus the *Pall Mall Gazette* once proposed "the establishment of a permanent Native Department at the Cape, empowered by the Imperial Government to deal in concert with the Colonial Government with all native questions as they arise, on certain easily defined and well-established lines." Mr. Saul Solomon, one of the ablest of Cape statesmen, also advocates the government of native districts from home through the governor at the Cape, and by means of a special magisterial and police service, leaving some kind of veto to the Cape Parliament. The practical objections to such a course which are at once obvious are that large areas, now or hereafter more or less under British influence and for which the British are responsible, are altogether unprovided for, as are many native districts contiguous to Natal. There is the recent instance of Bechuanaland. Neither the Government nor the Parliament of the Cape Colony have been able to come to any decision as to that enormous native territory. Had a "Native Department" or "Governor" to wait for the advice or consent of the Cape Colony authorities, he might often have to wait until the occasion for action was gone for ever, and he would frequently find that advice given one year would be reversed the next. But all the schemes which involve joint action on the part of the Imperial and Colonial Governments must involve joint control and joint contribution, if they are to be practically successful. These are matters even more difficult of adjustment than joint advice.

Lord Grey advises—"The management of our relations with the tribes, which are more or less within the reach of British influence, as well as with the Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange State, ought to be brought under the sole control of the Governor and High Commissioner who represents the Crown, without his being hampered by having to follow the advice of Ministers responsible to the local Parliaments only." The late Sir Bartle Frere would place with the natives, but under the orders of the High Commissioner, "an English official entrusted with sufficient powers, and charged to do right and execute justice according to English ideas, but through native machinery of administration, and to give security of life and property to the people." It is, however, to a speech of Lord Carnarvon's, in the House of Lords, that we can turn for the most concise description of the complete type of administration that is requisite:—

"The power of responsible government in the colony was by no

means the best instrument for dealing with the natives on native affairs. These native tribes looked with much more confidence to a single head, such as the Queen or a resident governor, than to an assembly of responsible representatives. The very system of parliamentary government involved a frequent change of officers and functionaries, and it was impossible in such circumstances there could be that fixity and continuity of government which was absolutely essential in dealing with native races. A far easier and better system of government for such a country and people would be something in the nature of the government of Crown colonies, but of the simplest possible kind. What we had to do was to make every native feel that justice was administered as between man and man."

It seems, however, that the key-note of a complete system has not yet been struck by any of the statesmen who have dealt with this question. Many home statesmen have failed to grasp actual geographical conditions; the horizon of the South African statesman is too often limited to that of his own colony. In short, it may be said that hitherto progress in South Africa has been retarded because most of the measures applied have been interfered with, either by those who did not know South Africa or by those who did not know any other country.

Taking a properly wide view it becomes most evident that, if the English are to redeem their pledge to protect the natives, and also their desire to relieve their own two colonies of the greatest burden under which they struggle at present, the English nation must take up this native question as a whole. We must deal on common lines with Bechuanaland, Basutoland, the Transkei territories, and Zululand. In so doing all things will come easier; economy, security, and success are thus, and thus alone, to be ensured. That is the problem. Local experience coupled with applicable experience of what has been successfully done in other places, suggests a practicable and easy solution. But these things can only be carried through under the seal of authority. The political exigencies of the Liberal Government prevented their formulating, at the time, any permanent native policy for South Africa, or drawing upon the ample knowledge and experience at the command of the Colonial Office. The Conservative Government naturally hold their hand just now, but the Secretary for the Colonies has said that inquiry and consideration may easily lead to action. Many advocate the prompt reference of the whole question to a Royal Commission. Certainly there must be a collecting and a collating, by independent hands, of the necessary information; above all, there must be hearty co-operation between the home and the colonial authorities. By thus inaugurating a new and fundamental departure in South African native policy the Imperial Government may rid both South Africa

and England of an exhausting political abscess that has defied all palliative treatment.

The present position of affairs in South Africa is favourable to such a new departure. The English taxpayer has just put down a million sterling in Bechuanaland; in Basutoland and the Transkei something strenuous will have to be done to vindicate our authority, and, indeed, our reputation; Zululand appears to be on the eve of annexation. Now, is therefore the accepted time. The Transkei is breeding troubles from which the Cape Government would fain escape; the feeling is strong in the Cape Colony that it is foolish for so young a community to burden itself with affairs outside its own already vast territories.

Some remedy, then, must be devised which will bring the natives permanently under the control of consistent civilization, and immediately under the control of force immeasurably their superior. We shall thus and thus alone fulfil to them our pledges in the cause of humanity and justice; we shall relieve our fellow-countrymen of the Cape Colony and Natal of harassing and distracting burdens, and leave them free and unfettered to concentrate all their energies and attention on the development of their own resources. We shall follow at once our duty and our interest in thus taking a new departure in South African native policy. And that departure must be based on unprejudiced inquiry, and proceed in the direction of instituting a new independent control of native affairs. And it can only be undertaken with success by bringing to its aid both the local experience of the colonists and the world-wide experience of the Imperial Government.

In this article I have shown what definite work may be at once undertaken by the authorities in South Africa as well as by the Imperial authorities—the one in various internal matters, and the other in promptly defining and solving the great problem of a definite native policy—in order to secure at the least expenditure a better prosperity for both Europeans and natives in South Africa. I commenced by pointing out that the English taxpayer has sown as seed in South Africa at least £30,000,000 of invested moneys, and that he has weeded and watered and guarded this domain by continuous expenditure, which in the total already reaches many millions sterling. The harvest-time approaches when he may, if he will, reap the fruits of all this, not only in opening up new channels for his own trade, but also in assisting his fellow-citizens in South Africa to attain to a substantial prosperity greater than any they have yet known, and, at the same time, in securing to several millions of natives for whose well-being he has already made himself morally responsible, unprecedented advance on the paths of Christianity and civilization.

GEORGE BADEN-POWELL.

RECREATIVE LEARNING AND VOLUNTARY TEACHING.

IN a paper read last year at the Birmingham meeting of the Social Science Congress, Mr. Walter Besant drew attention to what he called "the great voluntary movement of the present day." "It is the noblest thing," he said, "the world has ever seen, and I believe it is only just beginning. More and more we are getting volunteer labour into almost every department."

Mr. Besant's object in speaking was to point out a fresh channel for the energies of voluntary workers. He told of the grim and sordid ugliness and dullness which wrap the lives of thousands upon thousands of the dwellers in East London—"the biggest, ugliest, and meanest city in the whole world;" of the men and women who are crowded together to minister to our needs and luxuries, their own existence empty of all that makes life bright or beautiful, while temptations to that which is evil and debasing beset them on every side. And then he spoke, as an artist may, of the beauty and the joy of art.

"No life," he said, "can be wholly unhappy which is cheered by the power of playing an instrument, dancing, painting, carving, modelling, singing, making fiction, writing poetry; it is not necessary to do these things so well as to be able to live by them, but every man who practises one of these arts is during his work drawn out of himself and away from the bad conditions of his life. . . . We wish that every boy and every girl shall learn something, and it matters little whether we make him draw, design, paint, decorate, carve, work in brass or in leather, . . . provided he be instructed in the true principles of art. Imagine, if you can, a time when in every family of boys and girls one shall be a musician, and another a carver in wood, and a third a painter; when every home shall be full of artistic and beautiful things, and the present ugliness be only remembered as a kind of bad dream. This may appear to some impossible; but it is, on the other hand, very possible, and sure to come to pass in the immediate future."

justifying the title of the "Apologetic Colony." They complain of the shortcomings of Nature, man, animals, and plants—as though droughts, lying, scab, and rust were not equally serious pests in other lands. For instance, how does the Cape Colony compare with prosperous, go-ahead New South Wales, where the Minister for Mines the other day did not scruple to point out that the recent severe droughts had robbed that colony of stock to the value of £4,000,000. The only praise the Cape men have for themselves is as "pioneer farmers." Even a slight experience of what pioneers have done in North America and Australia shows that this praise is almost as unjustified as is the former condemnation. But while they are thus in error both in their apologies and their boasts, they fail to recognize the solid achievements which are very much to their credit. The French immigrants brought with them vines and intelligent knowledge of wine-making, but the new industry fell, under the upas shadow of Boer conservatism and indolence, to its present low and unprofitable level. English farmers at the Cape can, however, boast that they have introduced two new industries, producing respectively ostrich feathers and mohair. Ostrich-farming has, I believe, never been attempted elsewhere or at any other time; and although Angora goats are kept in Asia Minor, I have not been able to discover that they have been purposely introduced into any other country in large numbers. The English farmers at the Cape may therefore with much justice boast of their successful enterprise in devising and working up to a successful issue two new farming industries, which the keenest enterprise of farmers elsewhere, even in Australia or North America, failed altogether to start. To those who have, by the light of knowledge of similar industries and opportunities in such similar countries as Australia and North America, been inquiring of and watching Cape Colonists, it is most palpably evident that spirit and enterprise are by no means wanting, but that a little more proper pride and well-founded self-confidence would add weight to that English-bred enterprise which has already done so much for South Africa, and will yet do more as it influences for good the "stagnation systems of the original colonists."

It may be well here to note that a vigorous movement is now on foot, under the singularly able guidance of the Chief Justice, Sir J. H. de Villiers, appropriately to commemorate next year the landing of the Huguenots in South Africa, just 200 years ago. It may be hoped that this commemoration, in awaking worthy memories, will also revive those habits of sturdy enterprise and enlightened perseverance which those capable French immigrants brought with them from France, but which they appear in too many cases to have lost with their mother-tongue, which the Dutch rulers of the day so tyrannically suppressed.

Progress in South Africa is severely handicapped because the labouring classes are natives. Two evils result. In the first place, white labour is the backbone of nineteenth-century advance and prosperity. It is by the presence of white labour alone that the great mass of a nation becomes fired with unconquerable energy. This backbone is absent from the South African body politic. In the second place, the fact that the black is there ready to labour degrades labour in the eyes of the whites. I am not referring to sentiments or fancies, but to those actual opinions which do as a matter of fact regulate men's acts. My meaning will be sufficiently illustrated by one experience. A very respectable well-to-do English woman, living not one hundred miles from Cape Town, doing a successful small business in a big village, has three daughters now growing up. She told us she must emigrate to Australia. But why? "Because my girls are just the girls to do uncommonly well as domestic servants, but you can't send them out to service here, because they would serve *with* natives; and that's too degrading."

Thinking of things in this light, one might even see some reason in the barbarous wish that the Boer had had his own way all over South Africa, and left not a native behind. However, as it is, there is the native; and although there are signs in many settled districts that he may there die out any time during the next fifty years, none the less he is there for the present.

To my thinking one great step that could be taken to mend the failings of the present population is to plant somewhere and at once a new colony, as it were, of several thousand English. In 1820 the British taxpayer gave £50,000 to establish 5,000 emigrants in the eastern provinces. The admirable effects, industrial as well as national, of this comparatively small infusion of new energetic blood have been universally acknowledged. The general trade of the whole colony would receive an invaluable impulse from a new movement of this kind, the original nucleus acting as a permanent magnet, attracting other desirable immigrants from time to time. New Zealand is an instance of the rapid progress and prosperity attending on the organized colonization of tracts of territory by selected groups of emigrants. The Cape Colony or Natal, with its experience of wholesome invasion of Yorkshiremen in 1849, could not do themselves a greater good than at once setting about some new plan of organized colonization, and thus adding both producers and consumers to their communities.

Passing from the men to their natural environments, it is at once evident that great changes for the better are both possible and likely. The English territories in South Africa are of wide extent and of varied altitudes above the sea; there is every kind of climate, and although there is the necessary and usual admixture of drought

and flood, warmth and cold, barrenness and fertility, it is none the less an area capable of great things indeed. Happily, on every side one sees much more can be done than is or has been done as yet to promote prosperity. There is ample room for enormous improvement in the farming systems. Water, in all places sufficient for the watering of stock, and in many for the irrigation of cultivable lands, falls from heaven, but has for the most part been allowed hitherto to run off unused. This evil is even enhanced by the faulty system of stock-farming in vogue. According to this a certain head of stock is kept on one farm, of say 6,000 to 10,000 acres, and herded or kraalled every night on the same spot. Not only does this make their night quarters a simple hotbed of disease, but the necessary tramping to and fro to the feeding-grounds destroys all the herbage, and so hardens the surface that in a few years for long distances around the homestead no rain can penetrate, and all is bare. When rain does fall it simply runs off. All these evils are in process of being cured. During the last year and a half there has been an altogether unprecedented move in the direction of making dams and fencing in, and this even among the Boers. If to this can be added tree-planting in the Cape Colony on a scale at all similar to that at present in fashion in Natal, marked benefits will assuredly follow. Already Boer farmers discover that, with ample water and the better grazing capabilities secured by fencing, their farms will carry many more sheep, sometimes twice or three times as many as were carried before. Thus these very recently adopted reforms will not only improve the output, but lead generally to the adoption of other reforms.

No doubt the country itself is rich. The laugh has not always remained on the side of the scoffer. There is the Karoo district, which occupies the interior of the Cape Colony, and in which no grass whatever grows, although there is plenty of a small shrub known as Karoo bush. The legend of this district is, that a Scotch farmer arriving there remarked, "Poor country this."—"Yes," replied a local man, but it does capitally as a sheep walk."—"Walk! That's about all sheep could do there!" Perhaps it was the same scoffer who remarked, he supposed the Afrikaner sheep had such long legs because he had to gallop from one tuft of bush to another if he would get enough to eat in a day. Nevertheless, the Karoo is a splendid sheep country, very much as is the Mallee Scub of Australian notoriety.

Another main drawback to the rapid advance of South Africa has been the comparative absence of facilities of communication. Many tracts for many months in dry years are waterless, until wells have been blasted or creeks dammed. There are rough mountain ranges intersecting the country in many directions, but now the railway

system has been extended far ; and although the final junction line still hangs fire, which is to unite the whole system in one and connect all with the capital coal of the Indiwe and Cyphergat mines, nevertheless the main portions of the system are complete. But here officials check and hinder good results by levying very high rates on all goods—an imposition which Government should do its utmost to do away with. On the Eastern line, for instance, which runs from the seaport of East London up to Aliwal North, the distance covered is not 130 miles, but Government, on the plea of paucity of traffic, now runs one train every other day, and no night trains. The consequence is, that to do the distance by train it may take three days, or about the same time as a well-horsed cart. In America or Australia, if traffic is ever found to fail, the experiment, at all events, would have been tried of doubling the number of trains and lowering the rates. The business way of dealing with such things is undoubtedly to do all things reasonable to keep in full work the line and rolling stock on which so much capital has been expended, for even if the working expenses were barely covered by the receipts, the benefits enjoyed by those who use the line amply repay the community in the long run. Moreover, the feeding such fully employed lines would give much new and profitable employment to the now desponding “transport riders.”

In the matter of water carriage Nature has been so strikingly niggardly to South Africa as to induce the common remark, that Providence never intended any one to enter South Africa except by land. However, now a wise expenditure of capital has made Cape Town a real port, safe and accessible in all weathers. Along the south coast there are several landing-places, the chief at Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth, Port Alfred, East London, and Durban. But they are all impracticable for many days in the year, owing to the heavy surf that periodically breaks along this shore. Efforts have been made at each place to remedy this defect, but to an outsider the initial error seems to have been attempting in each of these five places to do something, whereas the expenditure thus frittered away, if concentrated on one or two, would have given South Africa three good ports, open at all times to ocean-going vessels—say at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban. The benefits of concentrated and sufficient expenditure are well proven in Cape Town. The money expended on all the other harbours, divided into two, would have sufficed to have given Port Elizabeth and Durban all the advantages of well-considered, complete, and sufficient plans. A coast line of railway connecting such places as King Williamstown and Grahamstown with Port Elizabeth, and Kokstad with Durban, would have given all three districts much greater facilities for shipping goods than they at present possess in the ambitious little ports frequent

along the coast but where communications are often interrupted for days, nay weeks, together.

The industries of South Africa are thus carried on under the disadvantages both of the personal character of a great portion of the inhabitants, and also of drawbacks of natural environment. Nevertheless, in many respects they contrive to be in some measure successful. The diamond industry, the exporting of produce from the interior (ivory and "skins" and ostrich feathers), and of the products of ostrich-farming and the keeping of Angora goats, and indeed the export of ordinary "sheep's wool," are at present the staple Cape industries. A chief reason of the present depression is undoubtedly the falling in prices of all these staples.

Of old the carefully regulated monopoly of diamond supply enjoyed by Brazil maintained high prices for diamonds; but the almost fabulously rich deposits discovered at Kimberley have thrown on the market nearly £50,000,000 worth of diamonds, and as a natural consequence the value of diamonds has fallen to one-third of what it was. At present the industry has felt severely this fall in price. But the cost of production is great, and much greater now that much of the best "ground" in the quarry-like mines is buried under the sides or "reefs" that have fallen in. The supply will be greatly curtailed, and it seems almost certain that prices of this article of export will shortly rise.

In regard to the products of the interior, skins and ivory year by year become more scarce, and although their prices, and especially those of ivory, even rise, still the supply of commodities dwindles so as to make it immaterial in the near future what happens in respect of these commodities, unless the opening up of an easy and well-protected trade-route up Bechuanaland taps for the Cape Colony a fresh source of interior trade—which it may easily do.

In regard to "feathers," there has, however, been a very serious falling off in price, which affects not only the interior trade, but also that industry of ostrich-farming which has been started with so much credit and at first with so much profit to the Cape Colony farmers. There does not appear to be much hope for increase of price here, for matters did not mend even when the great Soudan feather supply—estimated to reach an annual value of over half a million, or nearly as great as that of the Cape Colony—came to a sudden end, with the Madhi war. However, if Cape farmers can continue to supply the merchant at present prices at even a small profit, they will do well, as prices cannot well be lower. In regard to wool, as I have already said, a very great deal remains to be done in South Africa to improve the quality of the wool shipped. At very little expenditure of money, but at some expenditure of intelligence and energy, prices may in most cases be doubled.

At the head of reforms and improvements possible stand those in the political conditions under which men work in South Africa. There are four great European communities, and outside of them a variety of native States, territories, and tribes in various degrees of protection and dependence. Of the four European communities, two are Boer States and two English colonies. The Boer States being politically independent, have no further place in this argument, except that one would wish to put on record the warm interest and concern all Englishmen feel in their prosperity, and that they would fain wish them free of their threatening financial embarrassments, even though these wishes are largely leavened by well-founded anxiety. We can only hope that the Transvaal and the Free State may yet be able to prove the truth of President Brand's comforting motto, "*Alles zal recht kommen*," although Englishmen, not without some experience, prefer the motto, "*Heaven helps those who help themselves*," to the maxim which has so important a hold on all Boer natures, "*Wacht een bichte*," or, in plain English, "*Put it off*."

Of the two English colonies, the Cape enjoys responsible government, and is therefore outside the pale of imperial control of its internal affairs; but in the foregoing account of its industrial position I have ventured to touch upon such industrial reforms and improvements as are considered feasible and requisite by those who understand the Cape best. The application of such remedies is entirely in the hands of the people and administration of the colony itself. The other English colony—Natal—has not yet taken the full franchise of responsible government. It is in a transition stage, and although nominally its affairs are much in the control of the Imperial Government, actually a great deal is conceded to local initiative and local opinion and experience, especially in regard to all internal affairs. And judging by the past, the English in Natal are ever ready to join with the Home authorities in doing all that may be done to promote their own prosperity.

But the political conditions under which Europeans work in South Africa are entirely overshadowed by the one main feature of South African politics—the native question. It will be well briefly to describe these natives.

There are three main classes—viz., the black Caffres, the brown Bushmen and Hottentots, and the light-coloured half-breeds, or Griquas. As to their general characteristics we find among the first-named—the Ama-Zulus, Amatongas, Matabele, &c., who have been gradually pushing their way southwards from the north-east. Physically the most powerful, their national arm is a stabbing spear. They are friendly to Europeans when not on the war-path, but do not readily adopt the arts of civilization or European habits or clothing. These north-eastern hordes have striven to push back before them another



